REPLY: EFFICIENCY OF ITQS IN THE PRESENCE OF PRODUCTION EXTERNALITIES by Danielsson, Asgeir
245
Marine Resource Economics, Volume 15, pp. 245–251 0738-1360/00 $3.00 + .00
Printed in the U.S.A. All rights reserved Copyright © 2001 Marine Resources Foundation
Reply:
Efficiency of ITQs in the
Presence of Production Externalities
ASGEIR DANIELSSON
National Economic Institute
In his Comment to my paper, “Efficiency of ITQs in the Presence of Production Ex-
ternalities” (Danielsson 2000), Professor John R. Boyce claims that I’m wrong in
concluding that individual transferable quotas (ITQs) can achieve efficiency in a
fishery if there are some production externalities. Boyce presents an alternative
model and claims that I am in error to model production externalities as depending
on outputs of other fishermen rather than the inputs. In my paper, I chose to express
externalities in terms of outputs because it simplified the discussion. It seemed obvi-
ous to me that the production functions make it possible to transform a model where
the production externalities depend on inputs, into a model where production exter-
nalities depend on outputs and vice versa. Boyce claims that this cannot be true, be-
cause if it were, he would not be able get different conclusions when modelling pro-
duction externalities in terms of inputs compared to what he gets when modelling
them in terms of outputs. Some might think that this conclusion contains a contra-
diction.
In this situation, it is sufficient for me to show that my conclusions hold in a
model where externalities are expressed in terms of inputs. I will use the same
model as Boyce uses in his Comment. While Boyce concludes from this model that
ITQs are unable to achieve efficiency, my conclusion is that ITQs are able to do so,
and that quota price is able to regulate both the level of activity of each fisherman
and the number of fishermen in the fishery. I will present the model and demonstrate
these conclusions below, but first I will present an intuitive explanation of my con-
clusions.
An Intuitive Explanation
A fishery is economically efficient if the total allowable catch (TAC) is set at the
optimal level, and the activities of the fleet are distributed so that the optimal har-
vest (TAC) is caught with the minimum cost. In an “Olympic” system with a com-
mon TAC, the optimal TAC solves the stock externality, but the distribution of the
activities (and inactivities) of the fleet will be sub-optimal. The same would be the
case if the TAC were distributed among fishermen as non-tradable quotas. Except in
the case where the managing institution knows all cost functions of all fishermen so
that the initial allocation of quotas is also the optimal allocation, the resulting distri-
bution of fishing activities will be sub-optimal. If it is allowed that the fishermen
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can trade the quotas, and if they are all profit-maximizing price-takers, the market
for quotas provides an institution through which fishermen can organize an efficient
outcome. The fishermen with lower marginal profit will sell some of their quotas to
those with higher marginal profit until the marginal profits of all active fishermen
are equal and equal to the quota price.
It is important to note that ITQs perform two separate functions here. Firstly, it
takes care of the stock externality by limiting total harvest. Secondly, the ITQ-sys-
tem allows fishermen to exchange harvest rights so that the total cost of harvesting
is minimized. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that a given ITQ system will give
an efficient outcome. If the total quotas are excessive, ITQs will not produce effi-
cient outcomes. This is, I believe, what happened in the important cod fishery in
Icelandic waters in the late 1980s and early 1990s after the introduction of the ITQs.
However, even if the fisheries managers fail to set efficient TACs, ITQs may en-
hance economic efficiency (see Danielsson 1997). It may also be that the quota mar-
ket will not produce an efficient outcome, especially in the beginning, when fisher-
men do not have much experience with this kind of market and when there may be
widespread opposition to the ITQ system for various reasons. But, given sensible
management, the ITQ system provides the right incentives for an efficient outcome.
So far, I have not mentioned the main topic here, production externalities. I will
assume that the production externalities are of a special type where it does not mat-
ter to a fisherman which one of the other fishermen changes the volume of his ac-
tivities. The congestion problem in the salmon fishery in Bristol Bay, which Boyce
discusses in the beginning of his Comment, seems to be a good example. This is a
pure congestion problem. It does not matter to each fisherman which of the other
vessel owners decides to stay in harbor for one (marginal) day. The time that the ac-
tive vessels spend waiting in the queue will be shortened equally, and their harvest
will be greater.
Assume now that Boyce is correct and ITQs do not provide the correct incen-
tives for the efficient outcome in this case. This means that the equilibrium solution
in the ITQ case is suboptimal. The managers are assumed to take care of the stock
externality by deciding the optimal TAC. The ITQ equilibrium is suboptimal if the
omnipotent social planner is able to improve on it by reallocating some harvest
(fishing activity) from one fisherman (A) to another (B). This would be the case if
A’s marginal profit was lower than B’s, or if the change in fishing activity from A to
B affects the production functions of other fishermen. The equilibrium in the quota
market will obviously be such that the marginal profits will be the same everywhere,
and it is assumed that it does not matter to the other fishermen if it is A or B that
catches the given volume of fish. It follows that the ITQ solution must be optimal,
and Boyce must be wrong in his Comment. In the case of the salmon fishery in
Bristol Bay, it is obvious that the most efficient fishermen would maximize their
profits in an ITQ fishery by buying out the excess capacity. This will reduce crowd-
ing to its optimal level.
As fishermen other than A and B are unaffected when A decreases and B in-
creases his activity by equal amounts, the equilibrium price of the quota must be
equal to the marginal profit of these two fishermen. This marginal profit is the sum
of the marginal profit from harvesting one more unit and the change in the total
profit caused by the change in the volume of externalities that A and B face.
The analysis becomes a bit more complicated if it matters to the individual fish-
erman which one of the other fishermen changes his activities marginally. In this
case, ITQs can achieve the optimal solution if the contracts in the quota market in-
clude a clause restricting further transfers of quotas (as discussed in my original pa-
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A More Formal Discussion
The discussion, above, ignored the question concerning the number of fishermen in
the fishery. If the firms are different, one would expect that out of some set of po-
tential fishermen, those that find that they earn profits participate, while those that
would suffer losses in the given circumstances (including the given quota prices) do
not participate. I used this approach in my paper. Boyce insists that one must in-
clude this explicitly in the analysis. I, therefore, do so below.
I will assume that all agents are identical. I will also follow Boyce in his Com-
ment by ignoring the stock externality in order to concentrate on production exter-
nalities. For this reason, I have decided not to include the length of the season (T in
Boyce’s Comment) in the model. In an excellent paper, Clark (1980) pointed out
that ITQs might not be efficient if the stock (and therewith the productivity of the
fishery) declines during the season. In this case, there would be a tendency to over-
invest, as it is profitable to catch as much as possible during the first part of each
season. Clark pointed out that this problem could be solved by dividing the season
into a number of periods and allocating ITQs for each period, rather than for the
whole season. Boyce (1992) discussed this case in a model where the stock was in-
cluded. In his Comment, Boyce decides (sensibly) to ignore the stock, but retains T
as a separate decision variable even if the model is so constructed that there cannot
be any reason to choose T less than the maximum length of the season () T  when the
fishery is profitable. If TT < , some productive capabilities would be
underutilized, which means inefficiency. In his Comment, Boyce finds that TT =
in all relevant cases.
The social planner will solve the following optimization problem:
max , ( ) N pf z N z wz k N z − [] −− {} 1 with respect to and
and subject to Nf z N z Q ,( ) − [] ≤ 1 (1)
where N is the number of fishermen (vessels) in the fishery, p is the price of output,
f is the production function giving the volume of output, z is the volume of effort by
each fisherman (I use z for effort here to be consistent with the notation in my origi-
nal paper, while Boyce uses x for effort in his Comment. In my paper, x denotes the
fish stock), w is the unit price of effort, k is a fixed cost for the season, and Q  is the
(optimal) quota.
The Lagrange function for the social planner’s problem is:
LN p f z N zw z k QN f z N z =− [] −− {} +− − [] {} ,( ) ,( ) . 11 λ (2)
The first order conditions for an interior solution are:
LN p fN fw z =− + − [] − {} = ()() λ 12 10 (3)
L p f Nf z wz k N =− + [] −− = () λ 2 0 (4)
LQ N f z Nz λ =− − [] = ,( ) 10 (5)Danielsson 248
Let NSP be the optimal number of vessels and zSP the optimal effort of each ves-
sel. If equation (3) is multiplied by zSP/NSP and then subtracted from equation (4), the
resulting equation can be simplified to give:
() ( ) . pf f f zk SP −− − [] = λ 12 (6)
This equation will be useful below.
I will assume that there is a seasonal licence fee (or subsidy) of ϕ  for each ves-
sel. The managers of the fishery are assumed to issue licences and collect the fees
(or pay the subsidies). The fishermen in an ITQ fishery solve the following problem:
πρ ϕ =− − −− − () ( , ) pf z zz w z k tot    with respect to z (7)
where ztot is the sum of the effort of all fishermen, and ρ  is the price of quota. The
fishermen are assumed identical, so that ztot = Nπ zπ  in equilibrium, where Nπ  is the
number of fishermen (vessels), and zπ  is the effort of each vessel.
In this section, I will assume that the individual fisherman believes that ztot is
constant. In this case, the fisherman does not need to know the value of ztot. It is
enough to assume that he believes that when he increases his effort by one unit (and
buys the quota that makes this possible), the fisherman who sells him this quota,
must decrease effort (and the level of his production externalities) by one unit. This
assumption will be discussed further below.
As there is opportunity cost of ρ  associated with all use of quotas, the total cost
of all quotas must be subtracted in the fishermen’s profit functions. The initial allo-
cation of quotas will affect the wealth of the fishermen, but, as Coase (1960) pointed
out, it will not change the efficiency nature of the competitive outcome.
The first order condition for an interior solution is:
πρ z pf f w =− −− = () ( ) . 12 0 (8)
To complete the model, it is necessary to specify the equilibrium condition for
entry into and exit from the industry. It is the zero-profit condition, or:
πρ ϕ =− −− − = () . p f wz k 0 (9)
Let the equilibrium quota price be:









It is straightforward to substitute from equation (10) into (8) to show that equa-
tion (8) is the same equation as (3) in the social planner’s problem. If it is also pos-
sible to substitute from equation (10) into (9) and show that equation (9) is the same
equation as equation (4) in the social planner’s problem, it has been shown that
the ITQ solution gives zπ  = zSP and Nπ  = NSP. Substitution from equation (10) into
(9) gives, after simplifications:
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Using equation (6) to substitute for f in the fourth term on the left-hand side in
equation (11) gives:




















If there is no fixed cost (k = 0), the optimal licence fee is zero. If there is some
positive fixed cost (k > 0) and negative production externalities (f2 < 0), a negative
licence fee (i.e., a subsidy) will ensure efficiency. Equation (11′ ) and (4) show that
if there is no licence fee (ϕ  = 0) and negative production externalities, there is nega-
tive marginal profit from increasing the catch by one unit through buying a marginal
vessel and the quotas for it at the quota price which induces the fishermen to choose
the optimal level of production per vessel; i.e., the quota price which solves equa-
tion (8) when zπ  = zSP and Nπ  = NSP. It follows that the fishermen will move from the
social planner’s optimum to fewer than optimal vessels, larger than optimal catch
per vessel, and lower than optimal quota price. In the case of negative externalities,
like the congestion in Bristol Bay, ITQs will cause a decrease in the number of ves-
sels that is too large if there is positive fixed cost. According to the results in this
section, managers should subsidize the entry of new vessels to ensure efficiency of
the ITQ-system.
The Fully Rational Solution
Even if it has been shown, above, that there exists an efficient market solution with
ITQs and a licence fee when there are production externalities modelled in terms of
inputs, the result is in many ways surprising. Why is a pure ITQ system without a
licence fee always efficient when production externalities are modelled in terms of
outputs, but only sometimes efficient when the externalities are modelled in terms of
inputs? Why is a pure ITQ system efficient when production externalities are mod-
elled in terms of inputs and there is no fixed cost? What does fixed cost have to do
with the result here? It is true that the fixed costs are different in that they do not
cause any externalities. But why does this not matter when externalities are mod-
elled in terms of outputs? Boyce claims that by showing that one gets different re-
sults from modelling externalities in terms of outputs compared to modelling them
in terms of inputs, he has demonstrated that, “the duality theorems for an individual
price-taking firm do not aggregate to an entire industry.” Could this be the case?
Fortunately, the explanation is both simpler and more intuitive. When I dis-
cussed profit-maximizing fisherman in the previous section, I assumed that the fish-
erman who buys some quota believes that he increases his own effort by the same
amount as the fisherman who sells the quota reduces his effort. However, this as-
sumption is not valid in this model. There is a case where it is valid. This is the case
where there is no fixed cost. This also explains why the ITQ-system is always effi-
cient when production externalities are modelled in terms of outputs. It is because
the total output is given. If we had assumed in the previous section that the fisheryDanielsson 250
was managed with tradable effort quotas rather than catch quotas, we found that the
management system was efficient when externalities are modelled in terms of in-
puts, but not efficient when externalities are modelled in terms of outputs and there
are non-zero fixed costs!
I will now go through this formally. If the fishermen catch the total quota, then:
Nf z N z Q ,( ) . − [] = 1 (13)
Equation (13) defines a functional relationship between z and N. The implicit-





























If there is no fixed cost, equation (6) in the previous section gives that the nomi-
nator on the right hand side in equation (15) is zero in the social planner’s optimum.
It follows that the actions of the fishermen, assuming that total effort remains con-
stant, are efficient in this case. If there is some fixed cost, equation (6) gives that the
expression in equation (15) is not zero. The actions of the agents, which assume that
total effort remains constant, are, therefore, suboptimal when there is some fixed
cost. It follows that the derivation of the market solution in the previous section ig-
nored an important piece of information. If it is assumed that the fishermen are as
perfectly rational as us, the model builders, the first order condition for an interior










 −= () . 122 0 (8′ )
Assume now that the quota price is given by:





It is now easy to substitute from equation (10′ ) into (9) to get equation (4) in the
social planner’s problem when the licence fee, ϕ , is zero. If it is also possible to
substitute from equation (10′ ) into equation (8′ ) and get equation (3) in the social
planner’s problem, it has been shown that a pure ITQ-system without any licence
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Comparing equations (16) and (3) shows that they are equivalent if the term in









































This shows that if all agents are perfectly rational, the pure ITQ-system is effi-
cient. There is, therefore, no need for a license fee/subsidy even if there are some
fixed costs that do not cause any externalities and production externalities are mod-
elled in terms of variable inputs.
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